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ideas by words, pictures, or drawings; and that to uphold the Post-
master General's revocation would be saying that Congress granted him
the power of censorship, or the power to alone determine whether a
publication is good or bad for the public to read. This, said the court,
would be a radical change from the other standards regarding classifica-
tions, and "such a power is so abhorrent to our traditions that it
should not be easily inferred. '2 6
The Postmaster General in Esquire relied on the holding of Mil-
waukee Publishing Company, but as has been pointed out the matter
involved in the latter case was completely nonmailable. It appears then
that anything which the Postmaster General may properly declare non-
mailable, he may exclude from the second-class without denying mailing
privileges entirely, but where the matter involved is mailable he must
objectively apply the standards set by Congress.
The basis of the court's decision in the Esquire case was that Con-
gress had not intended to give to the Postmaster General the power of
enforcing tests of "positive worth" in determining whether a periodical
should be accorded second-class mailing privileges. The case suggests
the question of whether Congress could delegate such powers. It could
be argued that there is no constitutional right to cheap mail, that Con-
gress is not attempting to regulate the businesses of newspapers and
periodicals, but is merely performing a service, and in so doing may
name its conditions for performance. On the other hand, it may readily
be seen that the denial of second-class privilages would be likely to drive
a publisher out of business,- and in this respect actually would be a
regulation. The court of appeals in the Esquire case28 considered this
question and concluded that Congress might withdraw the second-class
privilege completely if it felt that the benefits of wide circulation were
not worth the cost of the subsidy, as there was no obligation to grant
it in the first place, but that Congress may not use the privilege as a
weapon to force compliance with its notions of what is worthwhile. To
allow a "merit test" would be to deny what is meant by freedom of
the press.
LEwis H. PARHAM, JR.
Criminal Law-Homicide---Application of Felony-Murder Rule When
Non-Felon Kills Felon
Under the common law a homicide, whether intentional or not, com-
mitted by a person in the perpetration of a felony, is murder by each
28Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. at 151.
"'Supra note 8.28 Esquire v. Walker, 151 F. 2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1945).
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of the felons.1 Commission of the felony supplies malice, which is an
essential element of common law murder.2 This doctrine undisputedly
applies in cases where: (1) one of a group of robbers intentionally
shoots a person in order to rob him; (2) one of the group accidentally
shoots the victim of the robbery; (3) one of the group accidentally
fires and kills a bystander.3 Statutes stemming from this doctrine have
been enacted in all but four4 American states. The various statutes are
not uniform in their requirements as to the felonies that must be com-
mitted for the ensuing homicide to be murder. It may be any felony5
or some similar provision ;6 a crime punishable in certain ways;T the
specific felonies of arson, burglary, rape, and robbery ;8 these plus other
named felonies, 9 the most common additions being mayhem and kid-
napping; or the four previous named felonies "or any other felony." 10
I The scope of this note does not permit an extended analysis of the felony-
murder doctrine. For such an analysis see: WHARTON, HoMIcmE p. 112 (3rd
ed. 1907); 26 Am. Jurm, Homicide §§ 64-69 (1940); 40 C. J. S., Homicide § 21
(1944) ; Arent, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the
New York Statutes, 20 CoRN. L. Q. 228 (1934) ; Crum, Causal Relations anid the
Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WAsH. U. L. Q. 191; Perkins, A Re-Examination of
Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 557 (1934) ; Perkins, The Law of Homi-
cide, 36 J. Cum. L. 391, 401 (1946).
2 CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 248 (5th ed. 1952).
'For a treatment of all the possible arrangements of parties in felony-murder
situations see Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53
DicK. L. REv. 3 (1949).
'Kentucky, Maine, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin; but see KEN. REv.
STAT. §§ 435.010-435.020 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. C. 130, § 1 (1954); S. C. CODE
ANN. § 16-51 (1952); TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE §§ 1207-1228, 1241, 1256 (Vernon
1948). The common law felony-murder rules would apply to some extent in all
these states.
I MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 619.08, 619.10 (1947); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-4
(1953) ; N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1044; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1937) ; S. D.
CODE § 13.2007 (1939); Wis. Cum. CODE § 940.03 (1955).
' ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 358, 363 (Smith-Hurd 1955).
'DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1009 (1953);
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 265, § 1 (1933).
'ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 314 (1940); IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-3401 (1942);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (1954); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2215 (1942); OmO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.010 (1955) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-30-3 (1953); VT. RFv. STAT. § 8240 (1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18-30 (Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5916 (1955); Wyo. ComP. STAT.
ANN. § 9-201 (1945).
'ARiz. CODE ANN. § 43-2902 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. 9 41-2205 (1947);
CAL. PEN. CODE pt. 1, tit. 8, C. 1, § 189 (Deering Supp. 1953); COLO. REv. STAT.
c. 40, § 2-3 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8350 (1949); D. C. CODE §§ 22-2401,
2402 (1951) (31 STAT. c. 854) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (Supp. 1954) ; IDAHO
CODE VOl. 4, c. 40, § 18-4003 (1948) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2 (1950) ; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1951); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 495-497 (Flack
1951); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 559.010 (Vernon 1953); MONT. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 94-2503 (1947); Nm. REv. STAT. vol. 2, § 28-401 (1948); NEV. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 10068 (1950); N. H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. c. 585, § 1 (1955); N. 3. STAT.
ANN. § 2:138-2 (1939) ; N. D. REv. CODE § 12-2712 (1943) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, § 1 (1938); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2402 (1955); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.48.030 (1952).
"
0 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (Corrick 1949) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(1953).
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These and other differences"" in the statutes must be kept in mind in
any discussion of this problem.
In the recent case of Comnwnwealth v. Thonas,12 a Pennsylvania
case, two men held up the proprietor of a store. After emptying the
cash register they ran out of the store and down the street in opposite
directions. The proprietor chased one of the robbers and killed him in
a gun battle. His cohort was tried and convicted of first degree murder
under the Pennsylvania felony-murder statute, which declares that "all
murder... which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt-
ing to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping,
shall be murder in the first degree."' 8  In a four to three decision the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the conviction, saying:
"If the defendant sets in motion the physical power of another,
he is liable for its result .... The felon's robbery set in motion
a chain of events which were or should have been within his
contemplation when the motion was initiated. He therefore
should be held responsible for any death which by direct and
almost inevitable sequence results from the original criminal
act."14
When a non-felon does the act causing death
Until recently it was uniformly held that the act causing death must
be in furtherance of a common purpose in order to be murder by all the
felons ;15 thus, when someone other than one of the felons did the im-
mediate act causing death, the felony-murder rule was not applicable.' 6
In State v. Oxendine,'7 where an innocent bystander was accidentally
killed by the intended victim of an assault with intent to kill, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the defendants were not guilty of
a' See notes 29 and 41 infra.2 Pa. -, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955).
' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930).
14 Commonwealth v. Thomas, - Pa. -, -, 117 A. 2d 204, 205 (1955).
"- Wilson v. State, 24 S. W. 409 (Tex. Cr. App. 1893) ; People v. Sobieskoda,
235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923).
" People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920) ; Butler v. People, 125
Ill. 641, 18 N. E. 338, 1 L. R. A. 211 (1888) (dictum, for a felony was not being
committed); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1085, 2 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 719 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 545, 83
Am. Dec. 705, 709 (1863) (where it was said by Bigelow, C. J., that if a man
in defending his home from a burglar were to kill someone else, "Can the burglar
in such a case be deemed guilty of criminal homicide? Certainly not.") ; State v.
Majors, 237 S. W. 486 (Mo. Sup. 1922); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa.
327, 184 At. 97 (1936) (where the charge of the court, indicating that defendant
rather than an outsider would have had to have fired the fatal shot to be guilty
of murder, was held to be proper) ; Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294 Pa. 339, 144
At. 534 (1928) (where a charge that if the fatal bullet was fired by one trying
to stop the robbery defendants would not be guilty of murder, was characterized
by the supreme court, not as incorrect, but as favorable to the defendanf).17187 N. C. 658, 122 S. E. 568 (1924).
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culpable homicide, there being no concert or purpose between de-
fendants and their intended victim.'8
The first variation from this rule came in the so-called "shield" cases
-cases in which the felon forced someone to occupy a position in the
line of fire of those trying to avert the felony, hoping, of course, that
his assailants would hold their fire. When the "shield" was killed, it
was held that the felon was guilty of murder because he had forced
the deceased to occupy a place of danger, causing his death.19
To tie in with felony-murder the theory of proximate cause, on which
theory the principal case is based, is not a new idea.20  The very nature
of the offence necessitates an application of some causation rule, but
there is a divergence of opinion as to what the rule should be. The
role of proximate cause under the classical view is that unless the felony
proximately causes the death no murder is committed. This rule is
negative in concept, preventing an inference of murder in such a case as
when a house burns down, killing the occupants, a burglar being in the
house at the time the fire started. But recent decisions tend to hold
that a felon is guilty of murder when a third person is killed by gunfire
intended for the felon in the prevention of the felony.2 ' This trend, of
" In the opinion it was said: "Suppose instead of killing an innocent bystander,
Proctor Locklear had killed.. . one of his assailants, would the law, under these
circumstances, hold the surviving assailants or confederates . .. criminally re-
sponsible for the homicide? We think not." Id. at 662, 122 S. E. at 570.
1 Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S. W. 2d 100 (1934) ; Keaton v. State, 41
Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55
S. W. 961 (1900).
" "The killing must have had an intimate relation and close connection with the
felony, and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it; and when the act
constituting the felony is in itself dangerous to life, the killing must be naturally
consequent to the felony. The death must have occurred as a-result or outcome of
the attempt to commit the felony." W~aRTox, HomiciDE p. 184 (3rd ed. 1907).
21 A policeman shot himself in a struggle with a felon for the felon's gun; the
felon was held guilty of murder, for "the shooting was a consequence naturally
to be expected from plaintiff in error's acts"; People v. Krausner, 315 I1. 485, 506,
146 N. E. 593, 601 (1925). In trying to prevent a robbery one intended victim
shot another; defendants were held guilty of murder because such a result "might
reasonably might be anticipated"; People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 255, 194 N. E. 539,
543 (1935). In a fact situation similar to that in the Payne case defendants were
held guilty of murder; "for whatever results follow from that natural and legal
use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible"; Commonwealth v.
Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 191, 53 A. 2d 736, 742 (1947), 17 FoRDHAm L. REv. 124(1948), 96 PA. L. Rtv. 278 (1948), 22 TuL. L. Rrv. 325 (1948). A policeman,
in trying to prevent the escape of robbers, shot another policeman; the robbers were
held guilty of murder, with reliance on the Moyer case; Commonwealth v. Al-
meida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595, 12 A. L. R. 2d 183 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U. S. 924 (1950), rehearing denied, 339 U. S. 950 (1950), cert. denied, 340
U. S. 867 (1950), 30 B. U. L. Ray. 422 (1950), 23 TEmP. L. Q. 423 (1950). In
trying to prevent a robbery deceased was killed when he wrested the gun away
from defendant and hit him with it, causing it to fire; defendant was held guilty
of murder because he set in motion the "cause which occasioned the death of
deceased"; Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 578, 251 S. W. 2d 404, 408 (1952).
See also People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N. W. 2d 201, cert. denied, 344
U. S. 845 (1952), rehearing denied, 344 U. S. 888 (1952), 1952 INmA. L. REv.(U. C. L. A.) 67, following the Moyer case; Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 1955) (dictum).
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which the principal case is a culmination, maintains that if the felony
proximately causes the death the felon is guilty of murder. This affirma-
tive application of proximate cause is not merely a different expression
of the earlier negative approach; it is an entirely different rule of causa-
tion, not necessarily following from the earlier rule. 22
That this affirmative application of proximate cause is a new con-
cept in felony-murder cases does not necessarily mean that the result
reached where a non-felon has immediately caused the death of another
non-felon is subject to criticism. In all of the cases which have followed
this trend the felony involved was one imminently dangerous to human
life,23 for the felon was armed and could expect armed resistance. 24 If
the cases holding the felons guilty of murder when a non-felon kills a
non-felon are limited to those situations where danger to others should
have been anticipated by the felons, they are not subject to strong crit-
icism, for this trend is but an extension of the "shield" cases25 and is
analogous to the concept of implying malice from wanton disregard of
human life.26 It must be remembered, however, that this trend is con-
trary to the earlier line of cases27 and perhaps reaches a less desirable
result in not fitting the punnishment to the crime actually committed
by the felon.
When a felon is killed
In the principal case, not only was the death-dealing force delivered
by someone other than one of the felons, but in addition the person
killed was one of the felons. The only other cases in which it has been
seriously contended that one felon should be held guilty of murder when
" The difference between these two rules can be illustrated by a more concrete
example: Unless a man strike another, he cannot be guilty of a battery. Butit does not follow from this that if a man strikes another he is guilty of a battery,
for there are many circumstances under which the striking of a person does not
amount to a battery.
2 Indeed, this seems to be the situation in all modern applications of the felony-
murder rule. According to Perkins, ". . . a study of the cases which repeat theformula that homicide committed while perpetrating a felony is murder, willdisclose that the other felony actually involved is one which may properly be
classified as 'dangerous,' . . ." A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43
YALE L. J. at 561. But in a case where it was not raised in the record, the
North Carolina Supreme Court refused to express an opinion "as to whether the
words 'other felony' as used in the statute [N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953)]
mean any statutory felony, or are limited under the eiusdem generis principle to
felonies dangerous to life." State v. Streeton, 231 N. C. 301, 305, 56 S. E. 2d 649,
653 (1949).
"' Cases cited note 21 supra.
- Cases cited note 19 supra. The only difference in reasoning in the two
situations is that in the "shield" cases the felon caused the deceased to assume
a place of danger for protection, while in the recent trend the felon caused the
deceased to be in a place of danger by the commission of a dangerous felony.
" People v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 144 N. E. 497 (1924) ; State v. Capps,
134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730 (1904) ; State v. Saunders, 108 W. Va. 148, 150 S. E.
519 (1929).
" Cases cited in note 16 supra.
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his co-felon was killed in the perpetration of their crime here cases
where (1) one of the felons killed another felon, 28 or (2) the deceased
felon accidentally caused his own death during the commission of the
felony. In People v. Ferlin,9 a California case, one arsonist was killed
in the fire; the other was held not guilty of murder because the death
was opposed to the conspiracy and not in furtherance of it. But in
Commonwealth v. Bolish ° in a similar situation, the defendant was held
guilty of murder on the proximate cause theory as previously expounded
in Pennsylvania. 3'
In only two cases previous to the principal case had the question
of murder even arisen when a felon in the perpetration of a felony was
killed by a non-felon. In People v. Garippo,32 an Illinois case, con-
victions of murder were reversed because, under the instructions given,
"plaintiffs in error might be held responsible for shooting done by an-
other person when there was no concert of action between him and
them."3 3 In People v. Udwin,3 4 decided under the New York statutes,35
it was implicit that if deceased had been killed by a prison guard instead
of by one of his fellow rioting prisoners the latter would not have been
guilty of murder.
Thus the Bolish case is the only previous case in which the death
of a felon otherwise than at the hands of his co-felons resulted in their
conviction of murder, and this on the theory of proximate cause. The
result reached in the Bolish case was criticized in able dissenting
8 Such killing, of course, must not be totally unconnected with the furtherance
of the felony undertaken. When D1 became "trigger happy" and took some
shots at a pasing automobile, D2 became furious at the needless risk of detection
and killed D1. Both D2 and D3 were held guilty of first degree murder. People
v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 52, 87 P. 2d 364 (1939).
"203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928). In People v. LaBarbera, 159 Misc. 177,
287 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1936), the same result was reached. This case is dis-
tinguishable, however, because the New York statutes declare that homicide is
"the killing of one human being by an act, procurement, or omission of another,"
N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1042 (Emphasis added), and that "the killing of a human
being . . . is murder in the first degree, when committed . . . by a person engaged
in the commission of, or in the attempt to commit a felony. . . ." N. Y. PEN.
LAW § 1044. (Emphasis added.)
In addition to New York eleven states (Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming) and the District of Columbia have statutes indicating a requirement
that one of the felons do the act causing death. Ohio and Wyoming statutes re-
quire that the act be done "purposely" as does the statute of the District of
Columbia, but in the last only in cases where the offence perpetrated is not one of
the enumerated felonies but any other act punishable by imprisonment.
" 381 Pa. 500. 113 A. 2d 464 (1955). The decision of the lower court, which
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed on other grounds, is noted in 59
DICK. L. Rav. 183 (1955).
"1 Pennsylvania cases cited note 21 supra.
'2292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920).3 Id. at 300, 127 N. E. at 78.
24254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930).
"2 See note 29 supra.
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opinions both in the lower court86 and the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania
When a felon is killed by a non-felon
Therefore, the result in the principal case was reached under the
following status of the law: (a) controlling state authority on the possi-
bility of murder when a non-felon does the act causing death, but a split
of outside authority; (b) controlling state authority of the possibility
of murder when a felon is killed, but with all outside authority con-
trary; (c) absence of authority anywhere that a felon is guilty of murder
when his co-felon is justifiably killed by one attempting to prevent the
commission of the felony.
Only through the proximate cause theory, that a felon is guilty
of murder if any death results from the commission of the felony, can
the holding in the principal case be justified. The decision is contrary
to the formerly well-established rule that the homicide must be in
furtherance of the felony.38  It cannot be justified on the ground that
the accused caused the deceased to be in a place of danger, for the de-
ceased voluntarily entered what he knew would be a dangerous under-
taking. Deterrance of criminal activity has been advanced as a justi-
fication of the decision. Whether general acceptance of the view of this
case would have an appreciable deterrent effect is doubtful.80 At any
rate, deterrence is a factor to be considered not by the court but by
the legislature.40
This proximate cause theory of Pennsylvania, applied in the principal
case, caused a man to be convicted of murder for a justifiable homicide
s'55 Lack. Jur. 213, 235 (1954).
7381 Pa. 500, 527, 113 A. 2d 464, 478 (1955).s See notes 15 and 16 supra.
"Certainty of punishment, rather than harshness, would seem to be the deterrent
factor in a situation such as this, and in all these cases the criminal is certain to
be punished for a felony if he gets caught. For a brief discussion of the deterrence
factor, see Ball, The Deterrence Concept in. Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIm. L.
347 (1955).
"O "With all the will in the world to wish otherwise, I can only see in the
Majority's Opinion an arbitrary exercise of power rising out of a zeal to combat
criminals, which zeal does not surpass that of the writer's. However, zeal must
be channeled into the ways of the law as written." Justice Musmanno (dis-
senting) in Commonwealth v. Thomas, - Pa. -, -, 117 A. 2d 204, 222 (1955).
"If it should be deemed essential to the public safety and security that felons
be made chargeable with murder for all deaths occurring in and about the perpetra-
tion of a felony ... the legislature should be looked to for appropriate exercise
of the State's sovereign police power to an end never yet legislatively enacted."
justice Jones (dissenting), Id. at -, 117 A. 2d at 221.
The 1955 Legislature of Wisconsin enacted a new criminal code which embodies
this proximate cause idea in the third degree murder statute: "Whoever in the
course of committing or attempting a felony causes the death of another human
being as a natural and proximate consequence of the commission of or attempt to
commit the felony, may be imprisoned not more than 15 years in excess of the max-
imum provided by law for the felony." Wis. CumI. CoDn § 940.03 (1955).
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and under circumstances in which the deceased should be considered to
have "assumed the risk" of the undertaking. This carries the affirmative
proximate cause idea to its logical conclusion and points out the inade-
quacy of this theory when applied as the sole criterion for establishing
the implied crime of felony-murder. The split decision in this case
shows a dissatisfaction within the court which has advanced the theory
most strongly.41
The use of affirmative proximate cause is not necessary for the ob-
taining of murder convictions when such ought to be obtained.42  If its
use is helpful in the understanding of what the law is doing in felony-
murder cases, such use should be limited to those cases where a person
trying to prevent a felony dangerous to human life accidentally kills
someone other than one of the felons.
JAMES P. CREws.
Damages-Loss of Profits-Standard of Certainty
Calling our attention to a much litigated area of damage law is the
case of Evergreen Amusement Corporation v. Milstead.1  The plaintiff
had contracted to perform the excavation for an outdoor theater, but
delayed completion two and one-half months beyond the date specified.
To the plaintiff's action to recover the agreed price for the job, the de-
fendant filed a counterclaim seeking damages for the lost profits caused
by the delay. The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to allow re-
covery of such profits holding them to be too speculative for the jury to
" The three dissenting judges based their dissents mainly on the fact that the
killing was justifiable, and thus concluded that no one, either legally or morally,
should have been held guilty of murder. This question involves to some extent
a consideration of the wording of the Pennsylvania statute. "All murder ...
which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree."
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1930). It was an obvious begging of
the question if such wording was meant to declare certain killings murder. All
such a statute can do is raise certain murders to first degree murder. Whether
or not the killing is murder depends on the common law definition.
In thirteen states (Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming) and
the District of Columbia, some form of the word "kill" is used instead of "mur-
der"; thus these statutes are definitive in nature. The same is true in Alabama,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, where "homicide is used. The Wisconsin
statute refers to causing the death. The rest of the felony-murder statutes are like
Pennsylvania's in using "murder."
"
2 A casual polling of laymen has revealed no one who felt that the defendant in
this case ought to be considered a murderer. The principal case deals with a set of
facts never previously considered in a reported decision in the United States.
Appeal would follow automatically on such an unsettled issue if prosecution were
brought. It would be absurd to say that a similar set of facts never existed be-
fore. The reason for failure to prosecute for murder in such a case must be the
failure on the part of the states' officials to consider it appropriate, or even to
consider it at all.
1206 Md. 610, 112 A. 2d 901 (1955).
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